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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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This paper examines the role of the Indian diaspora in the 
outsourcing of work to India. The data are taken from 
oDesk, the world’s largest online platform for outsourced 
contracts. Despite oDesk minimizing many of the 
frictions that diaspora connections have traditionally 
overcome, diaspora connections still matter on oDesk, 
with ethnic Indians substantially more likely to choose 
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a worker in India. This higher placement is the result 
of a greater likelihood of choosing India for the initial 
contract, due in large part to taste-based preferences, and 
substantial path dependence in location choices. The 
paper further examines wage and performance outcomes 
of outsourcing as a function of ethnic connections.  
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1. Introduction 
The economic integration of developing countries into world markets is an important stepping 
stone for economic transitions and growth. This integration can be quite challenging, however, 
due to the many differences across countries in language, cultural understanding, legal 
regulations, and much more. As a consequence, business and social networks are valuable 
mechanisms for achieving this integration (Rauch 2001). Ethnicity-based interactions and 
diaspora connections are a prominent form of these networks. The benefits typically cited for 
diaspora networks include stronger access to information (especially very recent or tacit 
knowledge), matching and referral services that link firms together, language skills and cultural 
sensitivity that improve interactions, and repeated relationships that embed trust in uncertain 
environments and provide sanction mechanisms for misbehavior. Such traits are hard to 
construct yet crucial for business success in many developed and emerging economies. The 
history of these connections stretches back to the earliest of international exchanges (e.g., Aubet 
2001), and studies continue to find diasporas important for trade flows, foreign investments, and 
knowledge diffusion. 
Over the last two decades, the Internet has become a potent force for global economic 
exchanges. The Internet links customers and companies together worldwide, enables labor to be 
provided at a distance, provides instant access to information about foreign locations, and much 
more. How will the Internet affect the importance of diaspora networks?  On one hand, the 
substantial improvements in connectivity and reduced frictions of the Internet may reduce the 
importance of diaspora connections. On the other hand, the online capabilities may provide an 
effective tool that complements traditional diaspora connections (e.g., Saxenian 2006). To shed 
light on these important questions, we investigate the role of the Indian diaspora in online 
outsourcing to India using data from oDesk. oDesk is the world’s largest online labor market, 
processing $30 million per month in contracts as of May 2012. It provides a platform for 
companies to post job opportunities, interview workers, monitor performance, and pay 
compensation. Workers worldwide bid on these jobs, complete tasks, and receive public 
feedback on their performance. 
India is the largest country destination for outsourced contracts on oDesk, with more than 
a third of the worldwide contract volume. We investigate the role of the Indian diaspora using 
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both descriptive and analytical techniques. A key feature of our data development, described in 
greater detail below, is that we identify company contacts located anywhere around the world 
who are likely of Indian ethnicity using ethnic name matching procedures. Our measures of 
diaspora-linked outsourcing to India build upon this identification of ethnic Indians (e.g., those 
with the surnames Gupta or Desai) who are using oDesk. 
The first main finding is that overseas ethnic Indians are more likely to outsource to India 
than non-ethnic Indians. In relative terms, the increase in likelihood is 16%. This higher 
likelihood is evident among many types of contracts and at different points of time, but its key 
feature is its importance in initial contract placement. These initial contracts are vital because the 
location choices of outsourced work for company contacts are very persistent, so long as the 
company contact achieves good performance on the initial contract.  
We then use a variety of approaches to assess why initial outsourcing contracts tend to 
have an important ethnic bias. The most prominent factor in the data appears to be taste-based 
preferences, where members of ethnic groups prefer to work with each other. While we are 
unable to say whether the taste-based preferences lie more with the ethnic Indians or more with 
the comparison groups (e.g., Anglo-Saxon company contacts being less inclined to utilize India), 
these biases clearly play an important role in initial choices. These choices then have lasting 
consequences, as employers are less likely to experiment with hiring new groups of workers if 
their past contracts achieve an acceptable level of performance. Beyond taste-based factors, we 
examine other noted diaspora attributes—such as overcoming uncertainty, better information 
flows, better bargaining power, and more productive matches—and find their roles to be weaker.  
An analysis of wage and performance outcomes on oDesk helps to inform the above 
conclusions, and this work is interesting in its own right. We find that diaspora connections 
provide cost advantages to the company contacts sending work to India relative to the other 
contracts that these company contacts form on oDesk. These cost advantages may come with 
small deteriorations in performance, but the wage savings are larger in magnitude. On the other 
hand, the workers in India are paid wages on diaspora-based contracts that are typical on oDesk 
for the type of work being undertaken in India. Likewise, workers’ current performance and 
future careers appear to be very similar across the contract types. 
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In addition to analyses that examine evidence of diaspora connections within the oDesk 
data, we demonstrate how the broader Indian diaspora in a country—measured as migrants from 
India as a share of country population—systematically connects to a greater ethnic Indian use of 
oDesk and a larger share of contracts being sent to India from the country. This background 
connects studies that consider diasporas from a macro perspective (e.g., linking trade flows to 
diaspora shares by country) with studies that consider micro evidence (e.g., that international 
patent citations are more likely among inventors of the same ethnicity).       
These results are quite striking. oDesk’s business model minimizes many frictions and 
barriers to outsourcing—for example, providing companies with knowledge of workers for hire 
overseas and their qualifications, providing infrastructure for monitoring and payments between 
companies and workers, and creating a labor market where workers build reputations that enable 
future work and higher wages. These frictions that oDesk minimizes, of course, are frictions that 
diaspora networks have historically been used to overcome. Our work suggests that diasporas 
continue to be important in an online world—if for no other reason than the taste-based 
preferences that shape contract placement. We view our results as a lower bound on the 
importance of diasporas in settings where frictions to interactions are larger.  
At a higher level, the Indian diaspora likely played an important, but modest, role in 
India’s rapid development on oDesk. At several points, we provide descriptive evidence of the 
magnitudes of these interactions that place upper bounds on how large this role could have been. 
For example, ethnic Indians account for 3.9% of oDesk company users in the United States by 
contract volume, while 29% of outsourced contracts from the United States go to India. We 
likewise find that only 5.7% of workers in India who complete three or more jobs on oDesk had 
their initial contract with an overseas ethnic Indian employer. These magnitudes suggest that 
diasporas continue to use online platforms in an effective manner, but that they played a modest 
role in the overall development of online work, at least for a country of India’s properties. 
With these results in mind, it is important to place our study of the Indian diaspora in 
perspective. We focus on a single ethnicity in this analysis, rather than undertaking a multi-
ethnicity comparison study, to facilitate greater depth around one example. India was the natural 
choice given its worldwide importance for outsourcing. India also has operational advantages in 
that its common names are fairly distinct from other ethnic groups. Yet it is also important to 
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consider India’s properties and the generalizability of our results. India’s conditions suggest that 
it may be an upper bound in terms of the aggregate impact from these connections. It may also 
be the case that other ethnic diasporas may face a steeper trade-off in terms of wage rates and 
performance outcomes than the Indian case that we describe below.1  
Our work also contributes to a developing literature that explores the operation of online 
labor markets and the matching of firms and workers. Agrawal, Lacetera, and Lyons (2012) find 
that workers from less-developed countries have greater difficulty contracting work with 
developed countries on oDesk. This is especially true for initial contracts, and the disadvantage 
closes somewhat with the worker’s platform experience. The authors suggest that some of this 
difficulty may be due to challenges that companies in advanced economies encounter when 
evaluating workers abroad. Our study suggests that diaspora connections to advanced economies 
help workers access these initial contracts, although as noted above this effect is of modest size 
relative to the overall development of oDesk in India. Mill (2013) studies statistical 
discrimination and employer learning through experience with hiring in particular countries. We 
find patterns similar to those in Mill’s work that are consistent with employer learning about 
groups of workers, and our work on ethnic connections provides an important foundation for 
understanding how this learning process commences and locating its boundaries. Using a 
creative experimental study on oDesk, Pallais (2011) finds that employers experiment with 
inexperienced workers too infrequently from a social-welfare perspective (e.g., Tervio 2009). 
Our path dependency results offer a related message to Pallais, demonstrating there is limited 
experimentation if initial selections are performing at an acceptable level. Finally, Stanton and 
Thomas (2011) document that intermediation has arisen in the oDesk market to overcome 
information problems about worker quality.2 
                                                 
1 First, India’s wage rate is low enough that it can be very attractive for outsourcing, and such gains would 
be weaker for higher-wage locations (e.g., the European diaspora). Second, India possesses several attractive traits 
needed for oDesk to operate effectively: proficiency with the English language, Internet penetration, available 
banking facilities, etc. To the extent that countries lack these necessary ingredients, it will be harder for diaspora 
connections to emerge around online labor outsourcing. Third, and most speculatively, there may be required levels 
of critical mass, in terms of the diaspora abroad and the potential workers in the country. Future research needs to 
analyze these traits more broadly.  
2 Autor (2001) and Horton (2010) review online labor markets. Montgomery (1991) models social 
networks in labor markets. Beyond labor markets, Forman, Ghose, and Goldfarb (2009) study the interplay between 
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The findings in this paper also relate to research investigating the outsourcing of work 
from advanced economies, the emergence of incremental innovation in developing countries, and 
connections between immigration and outsourcing.3  More broadly, these findings contribute to 
understanding the role of diasporas and ethnic networks in economic exchanges across countries. 
Ethnic networks have been shown to play important roles in promoting international trade, 
investment, and cross-border financing activity, with recent work particularly emphasizing the 
role of educated or skilled immigrants.4  This work has further emphasized the role of diaspora 
connections in technology transfer.5  Our analysis is among the first to be able to study 
outsourcing as a channel, and we derive evidence that links diasporas to both greater use of 
oDesk by ethnic Indians in a country and greater flows of outsourced work to India. 
These findings are important for managers. Generally, the development and growth of 
online labor markets represents an enormous change in terms of human resource decisions that 
firms make. Labor has traditionally been among the most localized of resources to a firm, and the 
ability of managers to use platforms like oDesk to globally outsource work effectively and 
cheaply will influence how competitive their firms are going forward. This lesson will more 
broadly apply to many other forms of trade in services as well. With respect to innovation and 
entrepreneurship, many companies are already using platforms like oDesk to outsource 
                                                                                                                                                             
local and online consumer options. Freedman and Jin (2008) and Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb (2012) study 
social networks in online lending. An example of off-line work in this regard is Fisman, Paravisini, and Vig (2012). 
3 For example, Feenstra and Hanson (2005), Liu and Trefler (2008, 2011), Amiti and Wei (2009), Blinder 
and Krueger (2009), Ebenstein et al. (2009), Puga and Trefler (2010), Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright (2010), Mithas 
and Lucas (2010), Harrison and McMillan (2011), and Tambe and Hitt (2012). Banerjee and Duflo (2000), Khanna 
(2008), and Ghani (2010) consider aspects of these phenomena for India specifically. Wang, Barron, and Seidmann 
(1997), Cachon and Harker (2002), and Novak and Stern (2008) provide related models of the sourcing choice. 
4 Broad reviews of diaspora effects include Rauch (2001), Freeman (2006), Clemens (2011), Docquier and 
Rapoport (2011), and Gibson and MacKenzie (2011). Evidence on foreign direct investment includes Saxenian 
(1999, 2002, 2006), Arora and Gambardella (2005), Buch, Kleinert, and Toubal (2006), Kugler and Rapoport (2007, 
2011), Bhattacharya and Groznik (2008), Docquier and Lodigiani (2010), Iriyama, Li, and Madhavan (2010), 
Huang, Jin, and Qian (2011), Nachum (2011), Hernandez (2011), Javorcik et al. (2011), Rangan and Drummond 
(2011), and Foley and Kerr (2012). Evidence on trade includes Gould (1994), Head and Ries (1998), Rauch (1999), 
Rauch and Trindade (2002), Kerr (2009), Rangan and Sengul (2009), and Hatzigeorgiou and Lodefalk (2011). 
5 Recent work includes Kapur (2001), Kapur and McHale (2005a,b), Agrawal, Cockburn, and McHale 
(2006), MacGarvie (2006), Nanda and Khanna (2010), Oettl and Agrawal (2008), Kerr (2008), Agrawal et al. 
(2011), and Foley and Kerr (2012). Singh (2005), Obukhova (2009), Choudhury (2010), and Hovhannisyan and 
Keller (2010) study related forms of international labor mobility and technology diffusion, and Keller (2004) 
provides a review. Marx and Singh (2012) consider knowledge flows and borders versus distance. 
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technological work to cheaper locations. Blinder and Krueger (2009) estimate that 34% to 58% 
of jobs in the professional, scientific and technical services industry can be offshored from the 
United States, two or three times higher than the national average. This outsourcing has become 
especially common among cash-strapped start-up companies for website development and 
mobile apps (e.g., Kerr and Brownell 2013). We provide new insights about how diaspora 
connections shape these contract flows and the biases that managers may have in their choices. 
Our work also provides insights on the overall effectiveness of outsourcing contracts to India.  
 
2. oDesk Outsourcing Platform and Ethnicity Assignments 
oDesk is an online platform that connects workers who supply services with buyers who pay for 
and receive these services from afar. Examples include data-entry and programming tasks. The 
platform began operating in 2005. oDesk is now the world’s largest platform for online 
outsourcing.6 The oDesk market is a unique setting to study the diaspora’s impact on economic 
exchanges due to its recent emergence and exceptionally detailed records. One important feature 
is that any worker can contract with any firm directly, and all work takes place and is monitored 
via a proprietary online system. In exchange for a 10% transaction fee, oDesk provides a 
comprehensive management and billing system that records worker time on the job, allows easy 
communication between workers and employers about scheduled tasks, and takes random 
screenshots of workers’ computer terminals to allow monitoring electronically. These features 
facilitate easy, standardized contracting, and any company and any worker can form electronic 
employment relationships with very little effort. 
A worker who wants to provide services on oDesk fills out an online profile describing 
his/her skills, education, and experience. A worker’s entire history of oDesk employment, 
including wages and hours, is publicly observable. For jobs that have ended, a feedback measure 
from previous work is publicly displayed. Figure 1 provides an example of a worker profile. 
                                                 
6 oDesk’s expansion mainly reflects increasing demand for online labor services over time. Statistics from 
compete.com, a company that tracks Internet traffic, show that unique visits to oDesk and its four largest 
competitors (some of which pre-date oDesk) increased simultaneously in recent years. Overall growth of online 
outsourcing slowed with the financial crisis, but oDesk has continued to grow rapidly. 
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Companies and individuals looking to hire on oDesk fill out a job description, including 
the skills required, the expected contract duration, and some preferred worker characteristics. 
After oDesk’s founding, most of the jobs posted were hourly positions for technology-related or 
programming tasks (e.g., web development), but postings for administrative assistance, data 
entry, graphic design, and smaller categories have become more prevalent as the platform has 
grown. After a company posts a position opening, workers apply for the job and bid an hourly 
rate. Firms can interview workers via oDesk, followed by an ultimate employment relationship 
being formed. 
We study the role of the Indian diaspora in facilitating oDesk contracts to India. Our data 
begin at oDesk’s founding in 2005 and run through August of 2010. The data were obtained 
directly from oDesk with the stipulation that they be used for research purposes and not reveal 
information about individual companies or workers. oDesk does not collect a person’s ethnicity 
or country of birth, so we use the names of company contacts to probabilistically assign 
ethnicities. This matching approach exploits the fact that individuals with surnames like 
Chatterjee or Patel are significantly more likely to be ethnically Indian than individuals with 
surnames like Wang, Martinez, or Johnson. Our matching procedure exploits two databases 
originally developed for marketing purposes, common naming conventions, and hand-collected 
frequent names from multiple sources like population censuses and baby registries. The process 
assigns individuals a likelihood of being Indian or one of eight other ethnic groups.7  
Several features of this work should be noted. First, some records cannot be matched to 
an ethnicity, either due to incomplete records for listed ethnicities (e.g., very obscure names) or 
to uncovered ethnic groups (e.g., African ethnicities). Second, this approach can describe ethnic 
origins, but it cannot ascertain immigration status. For example, a U.S.-based company contact 
with the surname Singh is assigned to be of ethnic Indian origin, but the approach cannot say 
whether the individual is a first- or later-generation immigrant. Third, while we focus on the 
Indian ethnicity, attempting to match on all nine ethnic groups is important given that some 
names overlap across ethnicities (e.g., D’Souza in the Indian context due to past colonization). 
                                                 
7 The ethnic groups are Anglo-Saxon, Chinese, European, Hispanic, Indian, Japanese, Korean, Russian, and 
Vietnamese. Kerr (2007, 2008) and Kerr and Lincoln (2010) provide extended details on the matching process, list 
frequent ethnic names, and provide descriptive statistics and quality assurance exercises. Stanton and Thomas 
(2011) further describe the oDesk platform. 
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Finally, while we use the terminology “Indian” for our ethnic assignment, it is worth noting that 
the procedure more broadly captures South Asian ethnic origin. Names originating from India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, etc. overlap too much to allow strict parsing.8  
We assign ethnicities to company contacts undertaking hiring on oDesk, with a match 
rate of 88%.9 The company contact is the individual within each firm that hires and pays for the 
service. In most all cases, this company contact is the decision maker for a hire. This is good for 
our study in that we want to evaluate the role of ethnic connections in outsourcing decisions, and 
this structure illuminates for us the person within the larger firm making the hiring choice.10 
It is important to note that during our sample period job postings only list the company 
location, not the company contact’s name. We know the contact’s identity through oDesk’s 
administrative records, but potential job seekers do not observe the names of individuals. This 
asymmetry removes the potential sorting of job applicants across contract opportunities in terms 
of company contact ethnicity (e.g., workers in India bidding more frequently for postings from 
ethnic Indians in the United States). Conditional on the year, job type, and country of the 
company contact, there are no statistical differences in the rate at which workers in India apply 
for the jobs posted by ethnic Indians versus other ethnic groups.11  
 
                                                 
8 We do not believe this name overlap has material consequences. The imprecision will lead to our 
descriptive estimates being slightly off in terms of their levels, but not by much given that India has by far the 
largest South Asian diaspora. For regressions, measurement error would typically result in the estimates of network 
effects being downward biased, but even here this is not clear to the extent that other South Asians more likely to 
work with India. Significantly, the estimations in Table 10 use specific data on diaspora and paint a similar message, 
including showing how a higher Indian diaspora strongly correlates with our ethnic Indian measure on oDesk. 
9 This match rate rises somewhat when removing records that are either missing names or have non-name 
entries in the name field (e.g., either the company is listed in the name field or a bogus name like “test”). The four 
most common surnames linked with the Indian ethnicity are Kumar, Singh, Ahmed, and Sharma.  
10 A related limitation, however, is that the oDesk data do not easily link company contacts into larger 
firms. This structure limits our ability to describe the firm size distribution on oDesk, but for most applications this 
has limited consequence. For researchers, this structure is operationally quite similar to patent assignee codes/names.  
11 Our data do not indicate whether side arrangments form between companies and workers. We suspect, 
but cannot verify, that the number of cases where an employer asks a pre-arranged contact to enlist on oDesk in 
order to employ them is low due to the fees that oDesk charges. It is more likely that successful employment 
relationships move offline and into side arrangements to circumvent oDesk fees. This would potentially impact our 
analysis to the extent that the likelihood of moving offline was greater for diaspora-based connections. We have not 
seen evidence to suspect that side arrangements have an ethnic bias to them. 
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3. Descriptive Features 
Table 1 presents the top 20 countries outsourcing work to India on oDesk. The United States is 
by far the largest source of oDesk contracts going to India, with 31,261 contracts over the five-
year period. A majority of all contracts on oDesk originate from the United States. The 
distribution of contract counts has a prominent tail. The United States is followed by Australia, 
the United Kingdom, and Canada, which combined equal about a third of the U.S. volume. 
Spain, the 10th largest country in terms of volume, has less than 1% of the U.S. volume.  
Columns 4 and 5 show the share of contracts originating from each country that go to 
India, both in total and relative to cross-border contracts only (i.e., excluding oDesk contracts 
formed with workers in the source country). Contracts to India represent a 29% share of all 
contracts originating from the United States and a 33% share of cross-border contracts. Across 
the top 20 countries, India’s share of a country’s contract total volume ranges from 18% in 
Switzerland to 55% in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The unweighted average of the top 20 
countries is 28%. The UAE is an exceptional case that we describe further below.  
Column 6 documents the share of company contacts in each country with an ethnically 
Indian name, regardless of how they use oDesk, while Column 7 provides the ethnic Indian 
percentage of company contacts on contracts that are being outsourced to India. For the United 
States, 3.9% of all company contacts who use oDesk are ethnically Indian, while the share is 
4.6% for work outsourced to India.12 This higher use for India specifically can be conveniently 
expressed as a ratio of 1.18 between the two shares. The average ratio across all 20 countries is 
1.30, with 13 nations having a ratio greater than one. Finally, Column 8 of Table 1 lists the 
average hourly wage paid to Indian workers on outsourced contracts. The range across the top 20 
countries is from $7 to $12, with an average of $10. As the average wage on oDesk for data entry 
                                                 
12 To put these figures in perspective, 0.9% of the U.S. population in the 2010 Census of Populations was 
born in India. These numbers are not exactly comparable, as our measure is based off of ethnicity, rather than 
country of birth, and includes South Asia more generally. Nonetheless, even after taking these features into account, 
the role of Indians on oDesk is perhaps twice as strong as the overall Indian population share. As a second 
comparison point, Kerr and Lincoln (2010) estimate the ethnic Indian share of U.S. inventors to be about 5% in 
2005 using patent records from the United States Patent and Trademark Office. This second comparison point uses 
the same name matching approach as the current project. It thus suggests that Indians may use oDesk somewhat less 
as a share of total users compared to their general presence in high-tech sectors. 
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and administrative support jobs is below $3 per hour, the contracts being outsourced to India 
represent relatively skilled work that involves programming and technical skills.  
Thus, the descriptive data suggest a special role for diaspora connections in sending work 
to India. The next sections more carefully quantify this role when taking into account potential 
confounding factors (e.g., the types of projects being outsourced), finding that this special role 
persists. But we also should not lose sight of the absolute quantity of the shares. Ethnic Indians 
in the United States account for about 5% of the U.S.’s outsourced work to India. The average 
across the top 20 countries is 7%, falling to 3% when excluding the UAE. While ethnic Indians 
are more likely to send work to India, the rise of India to be the top worker source on oDesk also 
appears to have much broader roots than diaspora connections.  
The unpublished appendix provides additional descriptive statistics. The top company 
contacts that send work to India display significant heterogeneity in terms of their geographic 
location and the overall degree to which they rely on India for outsourcing work. These company 
lists also highlight that, while much of the diaspora’s effect comes through the small actions of 
many individuals, the actions of a few can have an enormous impact. In particular, there is one 
company contact in the UAE that accounted for 906 of the UAE’s 989 contracts to India. This 
outlier is an ethnic Indian entrepreneur who uses oDesk for placing and managing outsourcing 
work, much of which is sent to India. Studies of diaspora networks often speculate about the 
concentrated importance of single individuals (e.g., Kuznetsov 2009), and oDesk provides some 
of the first quantifiable evidence of this concentration. This individual accounts for 7.7 times 
more contracts being sent to India than the next highest company contact and 2.4 times the 
volume from the Netherlands, the sixth-ranked country in Table 1. 
 
4. Persistence in Outsourcing Patterns 
Our analysis of diaspora connections on oDesk involves three steps. This section begins by 
describing the persistence in the geographic placement of contracts by company contacts. This 
persistence emphasizes the important role of initial contracts, which we analyze in greater detail 
in Section 5. Section 6 then considers wage and performance outcomes. 
Table 2 describes the key path dependency that company contacts display in the way they 
engage with India on oDesk. The sample includes all first and second contracts formed by 
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company contacts located outside of India. The first row documents that 39% of ethnic Indians 
choose India for their initial outsourcing contract. This rate compares to 32% for non-ethnic 
Indians, and the 7% difference between these shares is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The next two rows show a strong contrast when looking at second contracts. Differences across 
ethnicities no longer link to differences in propensities to choose India; the more critical factor is 
whether the initial contract outsourced by the company contact went to India. Subsequent 
contracts have similar properties to the second contract. Thus, with all the caveats that need to be 
applied to sample averages, these simple descriptives suggest that ethnicity could play an 
important role in initial contract placements, with path dependency then taking on a larger role. 
What drives this strong persistence in geographic choices? A very likely candidate is 
whether or not the company contact has a good experience on the first contract. Good 
experiences can create inertia where other options are not considered or adequately tested. Table 
3 examines this possibility with linear probability models of the location choice of second 
contracts. The first column considers the second contracts formed by company contacts that 
chose India on their initial contracts. The estimating equation takes the form  
,iii
iitjci
IndiantactEthnicCompanyConfulactSuccessFirstContr
IndiantactEthnicCompanyConfulactSuccessFirstContrOutcome
εχ
βδη
+⋅⋅+
⋅+⋅+=
 
where contracts are indexed by i. In the first column, the dependent variable is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if the company contact chooses India again. The primary 
independent variables are an indicator variable for the first project being a success (“good” 
performance rating or higher on the public feedback score or a successful evaluation in the 
private post-employment survey), the probability that the company contact is of ethnic Indian 
origin13, and their interaction. To control for many potential confounding factors, regressions 
include fixed effects for the (year t) x (job category j) x (country c) of each company contract. 
Thus, the analysis compares, for example, ethnic Indians and non-ethnic Indians outsourcing 
                                                 
13 This probability is assigned from the name matching algorithm. Indian names are linked to 5.3% of 
company contacts. Indian names are fairly distinct, so that in 90% of these cases the ethnic assignment is unique to 
the Indian ethnicity. Where the Indian assignment overlaps with another ethnic group due to a shared name, the 
regressor takes a proportionate value between zero and one. Table 2 excluded fractional values for convenience. By 
comparison, about 0.2% of contracts to Indian have a common surname, indicating the broader foundation of these 
ethnic connections than that likely due to family-based connections or similar.  
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web development work from the United Kingdom in 2009. Regressions are unweighted and 
report robust standard errors. 
The results in the first column speak very strongly for how good experiences on initial 
contracts generate persistence. Success on the first contract raises the likelihood of staying in 
India by 6.3% compared to a baseline of 57%. Ethnic Indians are somewhat more likely to 
choose India again, conditional on the rating of the first project, but these differences are not 
statistically significant. Column 2 shows that this effect is tightly linked with whether or not the 
company contact continues at all with outsourcing on oDesk. In total, 63% of company contracts 
that post a first contract to India use oDesk again in the future, and this return to the platform is 
closely connected to how well the first experience went. Finally, Column 3 shows the mirror 
image effect when looking at company contacts that outsourced their initial contracts outside of 
India. A successful first experience for a company contact outside of India lowers the likelihood 
of India being selected for the second contract by 3% compared to a baseline of 20%.     
Table 4 combines and extends the insights from Tables 2 and 3 by estimating across the 
full oDesk sample the likelihood of selecting India separately by experience levels of company 
contacts. These estimations take the form  
iitjci IndiantactEthnicCompanyConIndiaContractTo εβη +⋅+= . 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable for selecting a worker in India. Regressions 
continue to be unweighted and include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company 
contact. We report standard errors that are two-way clustered by company and worker.14 
Panel A includes the full sample of contracts, excluding firms located in India. The first 
column is for all contracts regardless of type. In the full sample, we find a significant increase in 
the likelihood of selecting India as a destination for outsourcing contracts when the company 
contact is of ethnic Indian origin. An ethnic Indian is 4.7% more likely to select India as an 
outsourcing destination than other ethnicities. This represents a 16% increase in the likelihood of 
                                                 
14 This clustering strategy takes into account the repeated nature of our data for both companies and 
workers. It is important to note that the likelihood of being ethnically Indian is not a generated regressor from the 
data. It is a metric based off of the individual’s names and external classifications of names. As the contact names 
are exactly known, this metric is the same as any other known trait of the person like gender or location.  
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selecting India relative to the sample mean of 29%. If conditioning on year x job type fixed 
effects, rather than year x job type x country of company contact fixed effects, the effect is 8% in 
absolute terms and 30% in relative magnitude. 
This remarkable increase in ethnic placement could result from many factors, and our 
subsequent analyses discern the most likely interpretations. Panel B starts by isolating cases 
where a worker from India applies for the position before the contract is awarded. This is a 
natural first check against explanations that center on ethnic Indians posting job opportunities 
that are simply a better fit for Indian workers. For example, there may be distinct skills that 
Indians worldwide specialize in that our fixed effects do not adequately control for. The ethnicity 
bias in Panel B is comparable in absolute terms to what is observed in Panel A, and it represents 
a 6% increase on the restricted sample’s mean. These results show that the effect is quite similar 
when isolating contracts where the company contact has a known option of choosing India. 
Columns 2-4 split the sample by initial versus subsequent contracts, in the spirit of Table 
2’s descriptive tabulations. We again see a very prominent role for ethnicity in the location 
choice of the first contract placements. The estimates in Column 2 for initial contracts are very 
similar in magnitude to the 7% differential in sample means in Table 2, with the regression fixed 
effects now removing many potential confounding variables. Ethnicity’s role in the placement of 
subsequent contracts is again lower in point estimate than the initial contracts. Unlike Table 2, 
these estimates do not condition on the first contract being in India, so a more substantial ethnic 
role can be measured due to the path dependency off of the initial contract. 
Columns 5-8 further examine the third and later contracts of company contacts. Column 5 
shows that the ethnic bias in this group, along with the means of the dependent variables, is quite 
similar to Column 4. Columns 6-8 separate these subsequent contracts into three groups based 
upon their prior experiences. The reported means of the dependent variables are critically 
important. In Panel A, India is selected 35% of the time when the company contacts have had 
prior success outsourcing to India, 27% of the time when they have prior experience but no 
success, and only 13% of the time if they have not utilized India before. Thus, path dependency 
plays a key role. With the die so strongly cast, ethnicity is second order after accounting for past 
experience. The one exception appears to be the greater likelihood of ethnic Indians returning to 
India after unsuccessful experiences. We obtain very similar results when instead using six 
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months of experience on oDesk to categorize experienced company contacts and their 
subsequent contracts. 
 
5. Ethnic Diaspora Placements and Initial Contracts 
The previous section emphasizes the persistence in geographical placements of outsourcing 
contracts, and thus the lasting importance of initial contract choices. It is in these initial decisions 
that much of the ethnic effect occurs. Continuing with the regression framework of Table 4, 
Table 5 analyzes these initial contracts to learn more about the role of ethnicity. Column 1 
repeats the base specification for initial contracts. The next columns split the initial contracts in 
various ways to look for clues within oDesk itself for what may be behind the ethnic bias.15 
A starting point is evaluating whether the ethnicity bias is connected to the very early 
days of oDesk’s founding and the development of online outsourcing. Many accounts of diaspora 
connections suggest that they provide stability and structure in settings where formal institutions 
are weak, and perhaps the initial contract ethnicity bias stems from a similar environment during 
oDesk’s emergence. Columns 2 and 3 split the sample by contracts formed during 2008 and 
earlier versus contracts formed during 2009 and after. This partition suggests that the Indian 
placement effect is growing over time. The means of the dependent variables, moreover, 
highlight that India’s share of initial oDesk contracts is declining from its level in 2008. These 
patterns suggest that the differences seen in initial contracts are not due to diasporas overcoming 
initial uncertainty about oDesk. These patterns do not completely rule out a role for uncertainty, 
however, as one could imagine a growing pool of heterogeneous workers in India increasing 
uncertainty about quality in the later period, leading to fewer contracts and a larger ethnic bias.16  
                                                 
15 A limit exists for how well internal variations can represent use of the platform as a whole. That is, we 
can understand more about the role of diaspora connections for overcoming uncertainty by comparing settings in 
oDesk characterized by more or less uncertainty. This internal variation, however, only imperfectly captures the 
extent to which diasporas overcome overall uncertainty regarding online outsourcing and oDesk. 
16 This time pattern is further striking given the evidence from Agrawal et al. (2012) that workers in 
developing countries have an initial disadvantage on oDesk—one may have expected that diaspora-based links 
could have provided a fruitful opportunity to overcome the initial uncertainty about workers. In general for India, the 
ethnic diaspora appears to have played a limited role in “unlocking careers” by giving workers in India a start. 9.4% 
of workers in India start with an ethnic Indian employer from outside of India. Of workers in India who complete 
three or more jobs on oDesk, 5.7% of these workers started with an ethnic Indian employer, as noted in the 
introduction. 
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As a second candidate explanation, accounts of diaspora connections often emphasize the 
ability of these networks to transfer specialized or tacit knowledge across places. India represents 
a large share of high-end contract work on oDesk, and it could be that the bias is due to the 
facilitation of this high-end work. Columns 4 and 5 split the sample by whether the job type is 
high-end or not.17 The ethnic bias is present in both categories, but it is bigger in low-end jobs. 
This suggests that while knowledge transfer may play a role, it is not the primary driver. 
Columns 6 and 7 provide some of our most important results. Our data indicate whether 
the hiring employer contacted workers directly after using the search feature of oDesk while 
recruiting workers. This search feature allows company contacts to select regions in which to 
search, and they can also utilize search strings like “SQL programmer India.” Unfortunately, our 
data only record if the company contact contacted individual workers prior to an organic job 
application initiated by the worker, not the details of the search. Column 6 isolates initial 
contracts where employers did not utilize this capability, while Column 7 considers where 
employer searches were used. The composition of potential hires in the first sample is dictated 
purely by the workers who respond to the job posting; employers actively shape the composition 
of their candidate pool in the latter case. The difference between the two groups is striking—the 
ethnicity bias among initial contracts built upon employer searches is two to four times stronger. 
This difference suggests employer recruiting behavior is an important part of the overall 
explanation for the ethnicity bias, and it is helpful to pause and review potential explanations. 
Our analysis so far suggests that the bias is not due to uncertainty during oDesk’s founding or 
due (in large part) to the easier transfer of specialized or tacit knowledge. At a minimum, the 
search results leave four remaining possibilities for why ethnic Indians would disproportionately 
outsource initial contracts to India: 1) taste-based preferences, 2) information advantages that 
ethnic Indians possess, 3) greater bargaining power of ethnic Indians with workers in their home 
region, and 4) productivity advantages that ethnic Indians possess when working with India.  
For the taste-based preferences hypothesis, it is important to note that the bias is 
observationally similar if the preferences are held by non-ethnic Indians. For example, 
                                                 
17 High-end contracts include networking and information systems, software development, and web 
development. The appendix shows that these categories have the highest wages on oDesk.  
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individuals of Anglo-Saxon or Hispanic ethnicity may prefer to not work with India, and this 
would look the same to us as ethnic Indians preferring to work with India. We thus do not make 
a strong (or normative) interpretation of the patterns, but simply use the terminology of taste-
based preferences to describe members of the same ethnicity wanting to work with each other 
simply due to tastes, rather than productive rationales or similar. 
For the information hypothesis, these advantages could come in two forms. First, ethnic 
Indians could possess superior knowledge that outsourcing to India is a strong option. The data 
already suggest that this is not a central factor. In particular, the biases remain constant or 
increase in Table 5 when Panel B conditions on a worker from India being among the candidate 
pool. More generally, outsourcing and India are so commonly associated with each other that any 
awareness gap should be minimal. The second form of information asymmetry could come 
through ethnic Indians being better able to evaluate worker candidates in India on oDesk. This 
would include, for example, an ability to navigate poor English language skills.  
Table 6 casts some early doubt on this hypothesis by showing that the traits of hired 
workers in India at the time of hire seem similar for ethnic and non-ethnic Indian company 
contacts. Panels A and B consider contracts lacking and including employer searches as part of 
the recruitment, respectively. The regression format is similar to that described for the analyses 
in Table 4. The differences in Panel A are minimal, while Panel B shows that ethnic Indians 
engaging in employer searches are more likely to hire a worker with greater self-reported 
proficiency in the English language. When hiring an experienced worker, they are also more 
likely to hire a worker with lower wage histories. These facts are consistent with a greater 
propensity to hire workers in India18, and the results do not suggest special roles for 
communication or worker screening. In the next section we further analyze the future 
performance of the hired workers to ascertain whether there is evidence of ethnic Indians being 
able to discern talents that these recorded attributes at the time of the hire do not capture. 
Our ensuing analysis continues with separating these hypotheses. Before doing so, we 
return to Table 5 and close with two important robustness checks. Column 8 shows that the 
results in the total sample are robust to dropping the outlier UAE firm noted earlier (note too that 
                                                 
18 Mean English proficiency scores are 4.88 for workers in India and 4.72 for workers outside of India. 
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this firm only has one initial contract). Column 9 shows similar patterns when looking at fixed-
price contracts. Contracts on oDesk can either be a negotiated hourly wage or a fixed-price 
deliverable. We focus primarily on hourly contracts given that wage rates are defined and 
negotiated for these workers. It is nevertheless helpful to see that a similar ethnic bias exists in 
fixed price work, too. 
 
6. Wage and Performance Effects of Ethnic-Based Contracts  
This section analyzes wage rates and performance effects of diaspora connections to shed light 
on the hypotheses about their origin. Table 7 considers wage and performance effects of 
diaspora-based contracts using variation among workers in India. Conceptually, this analysis 
provides the workers’ perspectives about the gain or loss from taking on a contract with an 
overseas Indian. The regression format is similar to that described for the analyses in Table 4, 
and the four panels provide wage and performance metrics for a sample of workers located in 
India. Column headers provide additional details about sample composition or estimation 
approach.  
Panel A reports the log wage rate paid on the contract, and Panel B takes an alternative 
route where we compare the wage rate paid to the hired worker to the median proposal made by 
other workers that bid on the same job opportunity. This latter approach provides an attractive 
baseline of comparison as the bids made by other workers are informative about how the work 
opportunity and its technical difficulty were perceived. By comparing selected bids to the set of 
proposals that company contacts receive, we better isolate the ethnic role in wage determination. 
The estimates suggest very limited wage effects from the perspective of the worker in 
India. Most variations find that diaspora-based contracts pay the worker about one percent less 
than comparable outsourcing contracts (i.e., same job category, year, and country of company 
contact). The appendix shows that this holds under further sample splits and variations.19 
Panels C and D consider performance outcomes. Panel C considers an indicator variable 
that takes a value of one if the public feedback reported about the contract is “good” or better. 
                                                 
19 Computational issues require that we report bootstrapped standard errors with re-sampling over workers 
for estimates with worker fixed effects. For comparison, the estimate in Column 1 would be -0.029 (0.013) with 
bootstrapped standard errors. 
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Panel D is constructed similarly, but it is instead taken from a private post-job survey conducted 
for oDesk company contacts. The results in both panels indicate that there are no performance 
differences for diaspora-based contracts relative to their peers. Effects are very small in 
economic magnitude and not statistically significant. The appendix shows that this null result 
holds regardless of whether employer search is used and for four other measures of performance: 
obtaining a wage rate increase on the contract, being hired again on oDesk, being rehired by the 
same company contact, and the worker’s wage rate on the next contract that he or she signs. 
We interpret these results as suggesting that workers in India operate in a competitive 
environment where they are paid market rates, regardless of whether or not a contract is 
diaspora-based. These results have strong implications for our four hypotheses of what 
determines initial location choice. First, they are consistent with taste-based preferences existing 
on the part of company contacts, but they are not consistent with significant levels of taste-based 
preferences among workers in India. Second, the null results for performance, especially the lack 
of rehiring of workers, do not align with stories about ethnic Indians having special information 
advantages or screening capabilities for workers in India. Similar to observable traits examined 
in Table 6, the future performances of the hired workers are not different for ethnic Indians. 
Third, the very small wage declines suggest that greater bargaining power by ethnic Indians in 
their home region is not likely. Finally, the overall lack of wage or performance consequences is 
not consistent with explanations related to productivity advantages of ethnic collaborations. 
Table 8 next repeats this analysis, but instead uses variation across contracts initiated by 
ethnic Indians living outside of India. Conceptually, this analysis shifts from the worker’s 
perspective to that of the hiring ethnic Indian. This sample provides a nice contrast with Table 7. 
This analysis is also informative about whether ethnic Indians have a general “technology” 
advantage in their work that is being captured in our study of their connections to India, but 
would also be reflected if we looked at other locations. The wage effects in Table 8 are much 
stronger than in Table 7 and suggest that ethnic Indians pay about 7.5% less when outsourcing to 
India than to other locations. Interestingly, we also see some suggestive evidence of performance 
declines compared to other locations, but these shifts are much smaller than the wage effects. 
Comparing Tables 7 and 8 suggests that the advantages of the diaspora connection, at least using 
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the variations available with oDesk itself, accrue more to the overseas ethnic Indian, while the 
workers in India have compensation and performance more in line with market conditions. 
Table 9 closes this analysis by considering broader variations across ethnic Indian and 
non-ethnic Indian company contacts. We analyze the aggregate consequences of company 
contacts outsourcing a lot of their work to India. Indexing company contacts by f, we first 
calculate the aggregate share of their contracts that are placed into India. We then relate this to 
the overall wage and performance outcomes of the company contacts with the specification  
.fff
fftjcf
IndiantactEthnicCompanyConaactsInIndiShareContr
IndiantactEthnicCompanyConaactsInIndiShareContrOutcome
εχ
βδη
+⋅⋅+
⋅+⋅+=
 
Our outcome variables are the cumulative wages paid and performance consequences of these 
contracts for company contacts, as indicated in the column headers of Table 9. We interact the 
India share metric with whether the company contact is ethnically Indian. Regressions are 
unweighted, include fixed effects for (year that company contact started on oDesk) x (modal job 
type of company contact) x (country of company contact), and report robust standard errors. 
The results suggest that greater outsourcing to India is broadly associated with paying 
lower wages and being less satisfied with performance. This is measured in comparison to other 
company contacts that started on oDesk in the same year and from the same country with similar 
types of jobs. While this pattern is itself interesting, our main focus for this study is on the 
interaction term that delivers null results across the board. This pattern says that all of the 
consequences (good and bad) from outsourcing to India come through greater engagement with 
the country, not from being an ethnic Indian. This stark set of results is consistent with a taste-
based preferences account, and it is inconsistent with most other accounts of why ethnic Indians 
are placing work into India (e.g., productivity advantages). From these and prior results, we 
conclude that taste-based preferences among oDesk actors in the originating countries is the key 
driver of the ethnic bias observed in outsourced contract placement to India. 
 
7. Link to Broader Diaspora Connections  
To this point, our analysis has only exploited data derived from oDesk itself, and yet at multiple 
points we have framed our analysis in terms of the general diaspora literature. There remains a 
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gap, as it could be the case that use of oDesk by ethnic Indians across countries is uncorrelated 
with the general Indian-ethnicity populations of countries. Rauch and Trindade (2002), for 
example, relate trade flows to the distribution of the ethnic Chinese population across countries, 
rather than the greater likelihood that two observed traders are Chinese.  
Table 10 closes this gap using empirical models similar to the gravity framework from 
the trade literature. The dependent variable in Columns 1-7 is the share of contracts originating 
from a country on oDesk that are outsourced to India. We focus on shares of contracts, rather 
than contract volumes, as the adoption of oDesk across countries as a platform for e-commerce is 
still underway and somewhat idiosyncratic to date. Shares allow us to consider the choice of 
India for outsourcing independent of this overall penetration of oDesk. 
The core regressor is taken from the World Bank’s Bilateral Migration and Remittances 
2010 database. This database builds upon the initial work of Ratha and Shaw (2007) to provide 
estimates of migrant stocks by country. We form the Indian diaspora share of each country’s 
population by dividing these stocks by the population levels of the country. We complement this 
diaspora measure with distances to India calculated using the great circle method, population and 
GDP per capita levels taken from the United Nations, and telephone lines per capita in 2007 
taken from World Development Indicators. We also calculate a control variable of the overall fit 
of the country’s outsourcing needs with the typical worker in India.20  
Column 1 presents our base estimation. We have 92 observations, and we weight by the 
log number of worldwide contracts formed on oDesk. The first row shows the connection of 
oDesk outsourcing to the diaspora population share, which is quite strong. A 1% increase in the 
Indian diaspora share of a country is associated with a 1% increase in the share of oDesk 
contracts outsourced to India. The country-level placement of oDesk contracts in India 
systematically followed the pre-existing levels of Indian diaspora communities. Looking at the 
other covariates, distance does not matter in the oDesk context like it does in many estimates of 
                                                 
20 We calculate this control by first measuring the share of contracts outsourced from the country in nine 
job categories indicated in the appendix. We likewise measure the distribution of oDesk work performed in India 
across the nine job categories, independent of where the company contact is located. We then calculate the sum of 
the squared deviations of these two distributions to measure how closely the work typically filled in India matches 
the needs of a given country. We subtract this sum of deviations from one, so that positive values represent a better 
fit, and we transform the measure to have unit standard deviation to aid interpretation. 
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economic exchanges. In fact, the share of contracts sent to India increases with spatial distance.21 
The overall fit of a country’s outsourcing needs with the skillsets of Indian workers predicts that 
greater shares of work are sent to India. On the other hand, country population levels and 
telephone penetration do not play an important role. We likewise find similar weakness in 
Internet penetration measures, but they are not as uniformly available. Finally, countries with 
higher GDP per capita send less of their work to India conditional on the other covariates. 
Many countries on oDesk have very few contracts, which can generate noisy share 
estimates. Our main estimations thus weight by contract volume to focus attention on better 
measured data and more meaningful observations; we utilize log weights to not overly 
emphasize the United States experience in particular. Columns 3 and 4 show similar results when 
we weight by log country population or when we exclude the weights. In both cases, the 
coefficients decline somewhat and the standard errors grow given the greater emphasis placed on 
noisy outcomes, but the role of diasporas remains economically and statistically significant. 
Column 5 shows similar results when adding a control for the total worldwide count of contracts 
on oDesk by a country. This variable picks up the negative effect earlier associated with GDP 
per capita. Column 6 tests whether this connection is simply following on existing business 
relationships that countries have with India. We measure the extent to which India is a trading 
partner of the focal country by the total volume of trade in 2007 between India and the country 
divided by the country’s GDP. Introducing this as a control does not affect our results.  
Column 7 shows that the elasticity declines when excluding the outlier UAE firm, but 
overall the pattern remains similar and statistically significant.22 Column 8 finds similar results 
when examining the dollar share of contracts being sent to India rather than the count share. The 
                                                 
21 Unreported estimations also find that time zones do not play a strong role in contract placement. The 
coefficient values suggest a negative effect of being further apart in terms of time zone, but these results are very 
small in magnitude and not statistically significant. Two important details to note are 1) many oDesk contracts (e.g., 
data entry) do not require extensive synchronous interaction, and 2) for those that do, many Indian workers are 
willing to work the originating country’s business day if that is needed for securing the job. 
22 The results are not overly-dependent upon a single country, and we find very similar results when 
excluding the United States, Pakistan, and similar. Excluding the UAE has the largest effect, resulting in a point 
estimate of 0.878 (0.660), which is not very surprising given that the Indian diaspora’s share of 35% in the UAE is 
by far the largest, twice that of the next-highest states of Qatar (18%) and Oman (17%). As a second approach, we 
find a point estimate of 1.629 (0.654) when winsorizing outlier diaspora shares to Oman’s value to cap the UAE’s 
extreme value. The role of the diaspora community is also very similar when including a control for English 
language proficiency, which we are able to assemble for about half of the countries in our sample. 
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coefficient declines but remains economically and statistically important. Finally, Column 9 
provides an important connection to our earlier estimation approaches. The dependent variable is 
the share of company contacts using oDesk in the focal country that are of ethnic Indian origin 
(independent of whether or not the work is contracted with India). Larger Indian diaspora shares 
in a country’s general population are highly correlated with a larger share of oDesk company 
contacts for the country being of ethnic Indian origin.23 
 
8. Conclusions  
Diaspora-based exchanges have been important for centuries, but the online world reduces many 
of the frictions these networks solved. This study investigates the importance of Indian diaspora 
connections on the oDesk platform for outsourcing. We find strong evidence that diasporas still 
matter and influence economic exchanges, even when many frictions are minimized. While 
diaspora connections may not have been the driving force in India becoming the top destination 
for oDesk contracts, they remain important for shaping the flow of outsourcing contracts. In fact, 
our case study suggests that the Indian diaspora’s use of the platform is increasing with time. 
Our study suggests that this importance comes from path dependency in location choices 
and a greater likelihood of overseas ethnic Indians selecting India for their first contract. Initial 
contracts are a very important, almost experimental, period where long-term habits form, and 
ethnic Indians are more likely to choose India initially. Our analysis suggests that taste-based 
preferences play the largest role for these initial choices. This preference may be on the part of 
the ethnic Indians, or it could reflect non-ethnic Indians being more reluctant to select India for 
work. Other factors such as better trust within diasporas in uncertain environments could also 
exist, but our analyses suggest that these alternatives are of secondary importance.  
These findings have important managerial consequences. The initial biases of managers 
can result in imperfect long-term arrangements, as path dependence and contentment with the 
status quo produce inertia in further experimentation. As online markets increase competition—
in oDesk’s case by breaking down the strong spatial partitions that have traditionally existed with 
                                                 
23 Using some of the partitions discussed earlier, the diaspora coefficient is 0.893 (0.263) for 2008 and 
prior, 1.085 (0.240) for 2009 and later, 0.798 (0.238) for high-end contracts, 0.592 (0.113) for low-end contracts, 
0.448 (0.232) for initial contracts, and 1.134 (0.334) for subsequent contracts. 
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labor markets—these biases may hurt firm performance in significant ways. Innovation and 
entrepreneurship will be particularly sensitive to these pressures given the high potential for 
outsourcing technical and scientific work and the globalization of this field’s labor force.  
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Figure 1:  Example of a worker profile in oDesk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 United States 31,261       0.285 0.329 0.039 0.046 10.28
2 Australia 4,162         0.287 0.293 0.033 0.029 10.04
3 United Kingdom 3,583         0.280 0.290 0.065 0.079 9.75
4 Canada 2,921         0.285 0.294 0.065 0.082 9.87
5 UAE 989            0.545 0.546 0.906 0.941 11.71
6 Netherlands 384            0.297 0.299 0.026 0.013 9.68
7 Germany 360            0.227 0.230 0.020 0.024 10.35
8 France 310            0.264 0.270 0.017 0.018 10.23
9 Ireland 305            0.300 0.301 0.029 0.059 11.41
10 Spain 269            0.237 0.243 0.010 0.019 11.93
11 Italy 232            0.375 0.387 0.010 0.011 11.25
12 Sweden 219            0.270 0.275 0.026 0.014 12.03
13 Israel 216            0.229 0.233 0.035 0.079 8.90
14 Belgium 170            0.276 0.278 0.023 0.038 10.33
15 Switzerland 170            0.184 0.184 0.008 0.024 10.41
16 New Zealand 165            0.198 0.198 0.038 0.012 7.17
17 Singapore 159            0.212 0.215 0.068 0.038 7.43
18 Denmark 149            0.246 0.247 0.004 0.017 9.70
19 Norway 135            0.325 0.325 0.010 0.000 10.00
20 Hong Kong 125            0.282 0.286 0.014 0.000 9.43
Notes:  Table describes the country distribution and traits of companies hiring workers in India. Ethnicities are estimated through 
individuals' names using techniques described in the text.
Table 1:  Country distribution of companies hiring workers in India
N Country
Number of 
contracts 
with worker 
in India
India's share of 
total contracts 
originating 
from country
India's share of 
total cross-
border contracts 
originating 
from country
Share of 
company 
contacts with 
Indian ethnic 
name
Share of 
company 
contacts hiring 
in India with 
Indian ethnic 
name
Average wage 
in US dollars 
paid on 
contracts with 
worker in India
Ethnic 
Indians
non-Ethnic 
Indians Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Share of company contacts selecting India on:
  First contract 0.39 0.32 0.07***
  Second contract, having chosen India on first contract 0.58 0.57 0.01
  Second contract, having not chosen India on first contract 0.20 0.19 0.01
Sample: 
Hired in 
India on first 
contract
Sample: 
Hired in 
India on first 
contract
Sample: 
Hired outside 
of India on 
first contract
DV: (0,1) 
Stay in India 
on 2nd 
contract 
DV: (0,1) 
Continue to 
use oDesk
DV: (0,1) 
Switch to 
India on 2nd 
contract 
(1) (2) (3)
(0,1) Success on first contract 0.063*** 0.057*** -0.030***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.007)
Probability that hiring contact is of ethnic Indian origin 0.061 -0.011 0.021
(0.043) (0.043) (0.031)
Interaction of success on first contract and -0.028 0.013 -0.013
probability that hiring contact is of ethnic Indian origin (0.054) (0.050) (0.037)
Observations 6,615 9,180 14,674
Year x job type x country of company contact FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dependent variable 0.572 0.625 0.197
Table 2: Path dependence for contracting with Indian workers
Notes: Tabulations consider contracts formed with company contacts located outside of India for whom the name 
classification algorithm perfectly classifies Indian ethnicity. Third and subsequent contracts are similar to second 
contracts. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Notes: Regressions consider persistence in location choice on second outsourcing contracts formed on oDesk by 
company contacts. The sample excludes company contacts located in India. Column headers indicate sample 
composition and dependent variables. The success regressor is a binary variable that takes unit value if the first 
contract of the company contact garnered a "good" performance rating or higher according to an internal survey or 
the public feedback score left for the employee. Estimates are unweighted, include fixed effects for year x job type x 
country of company contact, and report robust standard errors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 3: Success dependence for contracting with Indian workers
Total 
contract 
sample
Initial 
contracts
Initial 
restricted to 
repeat users
Subsequent 
contracts
Total sample 
with two or 
more prior 
contracts
With prior 
successful 
experience in 
India
With prior 
unsuccessful 
experience in 
India
Without prior 
experience in 
India
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probability that hiring contact 0.047*** 0.059*** 0.070*** 0.042*** 0.037*** 0.029 0.064** 0.016
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.032) (0.013)
Observations 157,922 35,863 21,289 122,059 100,770 59,203 12,717 28,850
Mean of dependent variable 0.289 0.319 0.311 0.280 0.274 0.346 0.272 0.125
Relative effect 0.163 0.185 0.225 0.150 0.135 0.084 0.235 0.128
Probability that hiring contact 0.041*** 0.073*** 0.099*** 0.029** 0.019 -0.010 0.064 0.050
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.011) (0.016) (0.021) (0.014) (0.016) (0.020) (0.039) (0.032)
Observations 71,668 20,525 11,644 51,143 40,651 27,674 5,048 7,929
Mean of dependent variable 0.637 0.559 0.570 0.669 0.677 0.739 0.684 0.455
Relative effect 0.064 0.131 0.174 0.043 0.028 -0.014 0.094 0.110
Table 4: Selection of India by ethnic origin of company contacts -- oDesk experience levels
Third and later contracts for company contact
Notes:  Contract-level regressions estimate propensities to select a worker in India by the ethnic origin of the company contacts. The sample excludes company 
contacts located in India. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for selecting a worker located in India. Panel A documents the whole sample, and Panel B 
considers cases where a worker from India applies for the position. Column headers indicate sample composition. Initial and subsequent contracts are from the 
perspective of the company contact. Regressions are unweighted, include fixed effects for year x job category x country of company contacts, and report standard 
errors that are two-way clustered by originating company and worker. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable is a (0,1) indicator for choosing a worker in India
Estimates include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact
Panel A: Total sample, excluding Indian companies
Panel B: Panel A conditional on a worker in India applying
Initial 
contract 
sample
2008 and 
prior
2009 and 
later
High-end 
contracts
Low-end 
contracts
Excluding 
employer 
searches
Only 
employer 
searches
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Probability that hiring contact 0.059*** 0.040* 0.072*** 0.044*** 0.089*** 0.030* 0.127*** 0.046*** 0.042***
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.012) (0.024) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.021) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 35,863 10,888 24,975 19,753 16,110 24,005 11,858 156,507 138,315
Mean of dependent variable 0.319 0.403 0.285 0.443 0.170 0.330 0.301 0.287 0.234
Relative effect 0.185 0.099 0.253 0.099 0.524 0.091 0.422 0.160 0.180
Probability that hiring contact 0.074*** 0.040 0.087*** 0.045** 0.127*** 0.049** 0.104*** 0.038*** 0.068***
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.016) (0.028) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.019) (0.026) (0.011) (0.015)
Observations 20,511 6,241 14,270 13,081 7,430 15,224 5,287 70,821 58,302
Mean of dependent variable 0.559 0.701 0.498 0.669 0.369 0.520 0.675 0.633 0.555
Relative effect 0.132 0.057 0.175 0.067 0.344 0.094 0.154 0.060 0.123
Panel A: Total sample, excluding Indian companies
Panel B: Panel A conditional on a worker in India applying
Notes:  See Table 4.
Estimates include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact
Table 5: Selection of India by ethnic origin of company contacts -- Base traits of initial contracts
Sample of initial hourly contracts made by company contacts Total sample 
dropping 
UAE outlier 
firm
Sample of 
fixed-price 
contracts
Dependent variable is a (0,1) indicator for choosing a worker in India
Worker's 
average past 
wages 
Worker's total 
oDesk hours 
worked
Worker's past 
average good 
performance 
rating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability that hiring contact 0.001 -0.010 0.003 0.048 -0.523 0.010
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.131) (2.665) (0.011)
Observations 70,364 67,245 70,364 54,168 54,168 26,622
Mean of dependent variable 0.770 4.789 0.044 7.569 62.73 0.550
Relative effect 0.001 -0.002 0.068 0.006 -0.008 0.018
Probability that hiring contact -0.007 0.032** -0.005 -0.409** 1.438 -0.002
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.010) (0.014) (0.005) (0.162) (3.650) (0.011)
Observations 71,989 67,988 71,989 57,103 57,103 28,824
Mean of dependent variable 0.794 4.705 0.056 9.925 87.18 0.589
Relative effect -0.009 0.007 0.000 -0.040 0.016 -0.003
Table 6: Descriptive traits of workers in India hired by ethnicity of company contacts 
Indicator for 
hired worker 
having prior 
oDesk 
experience
Self-reported 
English 
proficiency of 
worker
Indicator for 
missing English 
proficiency
Sample of experienced workers
Column headers indicate trait of worker analyzed
Estimates include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact
Panel B: Worker traits for company contacts utilizing worker search
Notes:  Contract-level regressions estimate differences in traits of initial workers hired by ethnicity of the hiring company contact outside of India. 
Panel A documents employers not using the search functionality, and Panel B considers cases where the functionality is employed. Traits of workers 
are indicated by column headers and further described in the text. Regressions are unweighted, include fixed effects for year x job type x country of 
company contact, and report standard errors that are clustered by originating company. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Worker traits for company contacts not utilizing worker search features
Total sample of company contacts located outside of India that are hiring abroad
Base estimation 
Including prior 
feedback and 
controls for 
worker experience
Experienced 
oDesk workers 
with controls for 
lagged wages and 
feedback
New oDesk 
workers without 
prior wages or 
experience
Including worker 
fixed effects
Companies with 
past experience 
with hourly hiring 
in India
Companies with 
past successful 
experience with 
hourly hiring in 
India
Dropping UAE 
outlier firm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probability that contract -0.029 -0.023 -0.011 0.053 -0.016** -0.026 -0.013 -0.030
is ethnicity-based (0.019) (0.019) (0.011) (0.046) (0.006) (0.027) (0.031) (0.019)
Observations 45,656 45,656 30,423 7,043 45,656 27,699 22,830 44,848
Mean of DV 2.120 2.120 2.155 2.008 2.120 2.130 2.123 2.116
Relative effect -0.014 -0.011 -0.005 0.026 -0.008 -0.012 -0.006 -0.014
Probability that contract -0.011* -0.010* -0.008 0.015 -0.012** -0.007 -0.012 -0.013**
is ethnicity-based (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.020) (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006)
Observations 45,654 45,654 30,421 7,048 45,654 27,698 22,830 44,846
Mean of DV -0.012 -0.012 -0.008 -0.029 -0.012 -0.008 -0.008 -0.012
Probability that contract -0.005 -0.004 -0.009 0.023 -0.016 -0.014 -0.002 -0.009
is ethnicity-based (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.036) (0.012) (0.023) (0.025) (0.017)
Observations 36,040 36,040 25,018 5,647 36,040 21,658 18,366 35,409
Mean of DV 0.540 0.540 0.535 0.520 0.540 0.582 0.630 0.533
Relative effect -0.009 -0.007 -0.017 0.044 -0.030 -0.024 -0.003 -0.017
Probability that contract 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.037 -0.008 0.006 0.030 0.001
is ethnicity-based (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.042) (0.014) (0.024) (0.027) (0.017)
Observations 35,790 35,790 24,866 5,617 35,790 21,536 18,278 35,160
Mean of DV 0.620 0.620 0.627 0.593 0.620 0.638 0.680 0.616
Relative effect 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.062 -0.013 0.009 0.044 0.002
Panel C: DV is a (0,1) "good performance" indicator from public feedback scores (feedback score greater than 4.5/5)
Notes:  Contract-level regressions estimate wage and performance effects from ethnicity-based contracts using variation among workers in India. The sample includes contracts formed between company 
contacts located outside of India and a worker in India. Regressions are unweighted, include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact, and report standard errors that are two-way 
clustered by originating company and worker. Fixed effect regressions bootstrap standard errors. Performance observation counts are lower due to ongoing jobs (99% of cases) or missing values.  
Worker controls include an indicator variable for whether the worker has previous experience, an indicator variable for an experienced worker without feedback, the number of prior jobs, and the 
feedback score as of the job application. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 7: Wage rate and performance effects among workers in India due to ethnic-based contracts
The sample is contracts formed with workers in India
Estimates include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact
Panel B: DV is percentage differential between accepted contract and median proposal
Panel A: DV is log hourly wage paid to worker
Panel D: DV is a (0,1) "good performance" indicator from private post-job survey
Base estimation 
Including prior 
feedback and 
controls for 
worker experience
Experienced 
oDesk workers 
with controls for 
lagged wages and 
feedback
New oDesk 
workers without 
prior wages or 
experience
Including 
company fixed 
effects
Companies with 
past experience 
with hourly hiring 
in India
Companies with 
past successful 
experience with 
hourly hiring in 
India
Dropping UAE 
outlier firm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(0,1) indicator that -0.151*** -0.145*** -0.056*** -0.252 -0.166*** -0.138* -0.164** -0.113***
worker is in India (0.041) (0.042) (0.019) (0.165) (0.059) (0.073) (0.073) (0.029)
Observations 7,640 7,640 4,538 1,528 7,640 4,348 3,686 6,225
Mean of DV 2.013 2.013 2.023 2.001 2.013 2.045 2.045 1.915
Relative effect -0.075 -0.072 -0.028 -0.126 -0.082 -0.067 -0.080 -0.059
(0,1) indicator that -0.023** -0.022** -0.017* -0.004 -0.017 -0.009 -0.008 -0.032***
worker is in India (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.023) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009)
Observations 7,640 7,640 4,538 1,528 7,640 4,348 3,686 6,225
Mean of DV 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002
(0,1) indicator that -0.012 -0.009 -0.012 -0.003 -0.005 0.003 0.006 -0.020
worker is in India (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.031) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020)
Observations 5,935 5,935 3,642 1,245 5,935 3,347 2,883 4,838
Mean of DV 0.623 0.623 0.592 0.660 0.623 0.679 0.679 0.553
Relative effect -0.019 -0.014 -0.020 -0.005 -0.008 0.004 0.009 -0.036
(0,1) indicator that -0.032* -0.032* -0.015 -0.054* -0.036 0.003 0.014 -0.045**
worker is in India (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.029) (0.023) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 5,900 5,900 3,619 1,244 5,900 3,338 2,879 4,803
Mean of DV 0.677 0.677 0.665 0.700 0.677 0.700 0.700 0.641
Relative effect -0.047 -0.047 -0.023 -0.077 -0.053 0.004 0.020 -0.070
Panel C: DV is a (0,1) "good performance" indicator from public feedback scores (feedback score greater than 4.5/5)
Notes:  Contract-level regressions estimate wage and performance effects from ethnicity-based contracts using variation among ethnic Indian company contacts located outside of India. Regressions 
are unweighted, include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact, and report standard errors that are two-way clustered by originating company and worker. Fixed effect 
regressions bootstrap standard errors. Performance observation counts are lower due to ongoing jobs (99% of cases) or missing values. Worker controls are those listed in Table 7. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 8: Wage rate and performance effects among ethnic Indian company contacts due to contracts with India
The sample is contracts formed with ethnic Indian company contacts 
Estimates include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact
Panel A: DV is log hourly wage paid to worker
Panel B: DV is percentage differential between accepted contract and median proposal
Panel D: DV is a (0,1) "good performance" indicator from private post-job survey
DV is log average 
wage rate paid on 
oDesk
DV is cumulative 
percentage 
differential between 
contracts and median 
proposals
DV is average "good 
performance" ratings 
over contracts from 
feedback
DV is average "good 
performance" ratings 
over contracts from 
private success survey
DV is number of 
workers hired divided 
by total number of 
contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share of contracts that are -0.135*** -0.075*** -0.070*** -0.071*** 0.021***
formed with workers in India (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002)
Share x ethnic Indian company 0.016 0.021 0.000 0.014 -0.002
contact (0.034) (0.015) (0.031) (0.030) (0.009)
Ethnic Indian company contact -0.041* -0.025*** -0.001 -0.002 0.007
(0.023) (0.010) (0.016) (0.015) (0.005)
Observations 35,863 35,862 30,097 29,889 35,863
Mean of dependent variable 2.088 0.026 0.510 0.637 0.935
Notes:  Company contact-level regressions estimate wage and performance effects from ethnicity-based contracts using variation among company contacts located 
outside of India. Regressions are unweighted, include fixed effects for first year x modal job type x country of company contact, and report robust standard errors. 
Performance observation counts are lower due to ongoing jobs (99% of cases) or missing values. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.
Table 9:  Analysis of bundled contract attributes at company level
Each observation is a unique company contact located outside of India
Estimates include fixed effects for company's first year x modal job type x country of company contact
DV is India's DV is share
Base Including Weighting Unweighted Adding Adding Excluding share of of company
estimation distance by log estimation worldwide trade with UAE dollar value contacts with
covariates population oDesk India outlier firm of contracts Indian ethnic
only contracts control for country name
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Indian diaspora share of 1.090*** 0.728*** 0.969*** 0.850* 1.135*** 1.004*** 0.531** 0.694* 2.577***
country population (0.197) (0.156) (0.364) (0.429) (0.218) (0.236) (0.204) (0.360) (0.188)
Indicator for geographical distance 0.071** 0.041 0.090** 0.087** 0.069** 0.077** 0.059* -0.033 0.004
to India of 5,000-10,000 kilometers (0.030) (0.026) (0.043) (0.044) (0.031) (0.033) (0.030) (0.056) (0.058)
Indicator for geographical distance 0.095*** 0.088*** 0.100** 0.092** 0.119*** 0.102*** 0.087*** 0.058 -0.074
to India of >10,000 kilometers (0.029) (0.030) (0.039) (0.041) (0.027) (0.033) (0.028) (0.063) (0.047)
Log population -0.009 -0.016* -0.017* 0.010 -0.009 -0.010 0.011 0.000
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.013) (0.007)
Log GDP per capita -0.042** -0.051* -0.045 -0.008 -0.041* -0.034 0.010 -0.078**
(0.022) (0.027) (0.029) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.039) (0.035)
Log telephone lines per capita 0.004 0.002 -0.004 0.005 0.004 -0.005 -0.056 0.052
(0.034) (0.039) (0.038) (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (0.055) (0.041)
Overall fit of project profile with 0.078** 0.070 0.054 0.085** 0.076* 0.074* 0.015 -0.032
India's worker profile (0.039) (0.047) (0.054) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.057) (0.083)
Log count of oDesk contracts -0.027***
worldwide (0.009)
Trade with India as share of GDP 0.660
(1.046)
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
Mean of DV 0.341 0.341 0.341 0.341 0.341 0.341 0.338 0.372 0.096
Relative effect (1% diaspora share) 0.032 0.021 0.028 0.025 0.033 0.029 0.016 0.019 0.268
Notes:  Country-level regressions estimate traits associated with a larger share of work being contracted to India. Regressions weight by log number of worldwide contracts formed on 
oDesk, unless otherwise noted, and report robust standard errors.
Table 10: Estimations of contract volumes formed on oDesk with workers in India
Dependent variable is share of oDesk contracts formed with workers in India
N
Number of contracts 
with worker in India
India's share of total 
contracts originating 
from company
Company contact has 
ethnic Indian name US State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 118 1.00 No Virginia
2 94 0.98 No California
3 73 0.26 No Florida
4 62 0.93 No Virginia
5 53 1.00 No Connecticut
6 51 0.98 No Wisconsin
7 46 0.38 No Florida
8 45 0.68 Yes New York
9 44 0.39 No California
10 42 0.36 No Nevada
11 40 0.56 No Arizona
12 40 0.63 No California
N
Number of contracts 
with worker in India
India's share of total 
contracts originating 
from company
Company contact has 
ethnic Indian name Primary country
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 906 0.58 Yes United Arab Emirates
2 68 0.36 No United Kingdom
3 58 0.53 No United Kingdom
4 46 0.84 No Italy
5 45 0.34 No Australia
6 44 1.00 No Netherlands
7 42 0.14 No Spain
8 40 0.38 No Australia
9 39 0.87 No United Kingdom
10 29 0.31 No Australia
11 29 0.32 No United Kingdom
12 29 0.63 No Denmark
App. Table 1b:  Largest non-US companies hiring workers in India
App. Table 1a:  Largest US companies hiring workers in India
Job category Total
Ethnic Indians 
who are hiring 
abroad
Non-ethnic 
Indians who 
are hiring 
abroad
Ethnic Indians 
who are hiring 
in India
Non-ethnic 
Indians who 
are hiring in 
India Total
Ethnic Indians 
who are hiring 
in India
Non-ethnic 
Indians who 
are hiring in 
India
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total count 102,819     3,333             85,151           1,296             28,394           55,122           1,590             14,155           
Networking & inform. systems 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 2% 1% 2%
Software development 7% 9% 7% 8% 8% 8% 37% 7%
Web development 40% 42% 42% 57% 63% 38% 41% 62%
Design & multimedia 9% 8% 9% 6% 6% 10% 4% 7%
Writing & translation 10% 9% 8% 6% 3% 11% 2% 4%
Business services 2% 1% 2% 1% 1% 2% 2% 1%
Customer service 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 1% 3% 0%
Sales & marketing 10% 11% 10% 9% 7% 10% 4% 8%
Administrative support 20% 16% 20% 10% 10% 18% 6% 9%
Total 8.6             8.6                 8.4                 9.3                 9.6                 8.7                 9.7                 9.5                 
Networking & inform. systems 16.7           13.9               16.7               11.1               12.2               16.7               10.6               12.4               
Software development 15.0           15.6               15.0               12.2               13.4               15.0               10.5               13.3               
Web development 12.2           11.1               12.0               11.1               11.1               12.0               11.0               11.1               
Design & multimedia 11.1           10.0               10.0               11.1               11.0               11.0               10.0               10.0               
Writing & translation 5.6             5.6                 4.4                 5.3                 5.0                 5.6                 4.4                 4.4                 
Business services 5.0             3.5                 3.3                 5.5                 4.4                 5.6                 6.0                 5.6                 
Customer service 3.3             2.2                 3.3                 3.3                 4.4                 5.6                 10.0               3.5                 
Sales & marketing 3.3             4.0                 3.3                 4.5                 4.4                 3.9                 3.9                 4.4                 
Administrative support 2.2             2.2                 2.2                 2.2                 2.2                 2.2                 2.8                 2.2                 
App. Table 2:  Distribution of oDesk job types and wage rates paid
Panel A. Observation counts 
Panel C. Median hourly wage paid to worker
Notes: Wage rates are calculated as the median wage paid to workers and are expressed in dollars. Sample includes contracts with ethnic name matches and identified job 
category classifications. Sample splits in columns 3-6 and 8-9 exclude company contacts for which a partial Indian ethnicity assignment is made. 
Companies in United States
Companies outside of the United States, 
excluding India
Panel B. Distribution of job types (ordered by median wage as shown in Panel C)
Initial 
contracts
Initial 
restricted to 
repeat users
Subsequent 
contracts
2008 and 
prior
2009 and 
later
High-end 
contracts
Low-end 
contracts
Excluding 
employer 
searches
Only 
employer 
searches
Workers with 
good English 
skills
Workers with 
poor English 
skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Probability that contract -0.040** -0.045* -0.029 -0.027 -0.031 -0.039* -0.0105 -0.019 -0.049 -0.026 -0.054
is ethnicity-based (0.020) (0.028) (0.024) (0.027) (0.023) (0.021) (0.037) (0.020) (0.030) (0.019) (0.055)
Observations 11,489 6,656 34,166 14,099 31,557 32,628 13,028 26,681 18,975 38,462 4,526
Mean of DV 2.218 2.185 2.086 2.375 2.005 2.392 1.438 2.010 2.274 2.145 2.038
Relative effect -0.018 -0.021 -0.014 -0.011 -0.015 -0.016 -0.007 -0.009 -0.022 -0.012 -0.026
Probability that contract -0.014 -0.022* -0.011 -0.011 -0.014* -0.019*** -0.001 -0.028*** 0.004 -0.012* -0.019
is ethnicity-based (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.015)
Observations 11,488 6,656 34,166 14,099 31,555 32,626 13,028 26,681 18,973 38,462 4,526
Mean of DV -0.018 -0.024 -0.009 -0.006 -0.014 -0.009 -0.017 -0.023 0.005 -0.009 -0.024
Probability that contract -0.005 0.009 -0.003 -0.032 0.007 -0.000 -0.016 -0.009 -0.002 -0.003 0.016
is ethnicity-based (0.024) (0.031) (0.021) (0.033) (0.019) (0.020) (0.029) (0.021) (0.024) (0.018) (0.045)
Observations 9,181 5,727 26,879 12,956 23,084 25,672 10,368 20,971 15,069 30,844 3,474
Mean of DV 0.466 0.511 0.566 0.425 0.605 0.532 0.562 0.516 0.574 0.546 0.482
Relative effect -0.011 0.018 -0.005 -0.075 0.012 0.000 -0.028 -0.017 -0.003 -0.005 0.033
Probability that contract 0.008 0.017 -0.002 -0.014 0.010 0.007 -0.006 -0.000 0.002 0.004 0.049
is ethnicity-based (0.024) (0.031) (0.021) (0.029) (0.020) (0.022) (0.025) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017) (0.049)
Observations 9,091 5,692 26,699 12,862 22,928 25,483 10,307 20,842 14,948 30,644 3,438
Mean of DV 0.596 0.604 0.628 0.582 0.640 0.616 0.628 0.589 0.662 0.623 0.600
Relative effect 0.013 0.028 -0.003 -0.024 0.016 0.011 -0.010 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.082
Panel C: DV is a (0,1) "good performance" indicator from public feedback scores (feedback score greater than 4.5/5)
Panel D: DV is a (0,1) "good performance" indicator from private post-job survey
Notes:  See Table 7.
App. Table 3: Separate analyses of Table 7 by split samples
The sample is contracts formed with workers in India
Estimates include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact
Panel A: DV is log hourly wage paid to worker
Panel B: DV is percentage differential between accepted contract and median proposal
DV is indicator 
variable for wage 
rate increase on 
current oDesk 
contract
DV is indicator 
variable for 
worker being 
hired again on 
oDesk
DV is indicator 
variable for 
worker being 
rehired by 
company
DV is log wage 
of worker's 
NEXT oDesk 
contract
DV is indicator 
variable for wage 
rate increase on 
current oDesk 
contract
DV is indicator 
variable for 
worker being 
hired again on 
oDesk
DV is indicator 
variable for 
worker being 
rehired by 
company
DV is log wage 
of worker's 
NEXT oDesk 
contract
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probability that contract -0.003 -0.002 0.004 -0.035* -0.002 -0.015 -0.000 0.028
is ethnicity-based (0.003) (0.010) (0.005) (0.018) (0.008) (0.027) (0.011) (0.038)
Observations 45,656 45,656 45,656 36,339 9,311 9,311 9,311 5,811
Mean of DV 0.022 0.796 0.039 2.156 0.035 0.624 0.062 2.051
Relative effect -0.136 -0.003 0.103 -0.016 -0.057 -0.024 0.000 0.014
Notes:  See Table 7.
App. Table 4:  Table 7's analysis with additional outcome variables
The sample is contracts formed with workers in India
Estimates include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact
All hourly contracts Worker's first hourly contract
Initial 
contracts
Initial 
restricted to 
repeat users
Subsequent 
contracts
2008 and 
prior
2009 and 
later
High-end 
contracts
Low-end 
contracts
Excluding 
employer 
searches
Only 
employer 
searches
Workers with 
good English 
skills
Workers with 
poor English 
skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
(0,1) indicator that -0.132*** -0.137** -0.158*** -0.098** -0.166*** -0.181*** -0.103** -0.132*** -0.191*** -0.112*** -0.182***
worker is in India (0.037) (0.055) (0.050) (0.039) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.039) (0.059) (0.028) (0.060)
Observations 1,687 957 5,953 1,447 6,193 4,180 3,460 4,463 3,177 5,642 1,321
Mean of DV 2.103 2.019 1.990 2.200 1.970 2.444 1.492 1.903 2.167 1.989 1.995
Relative effect -0.063 -0.068 -0.079 -0.045 -0.084 -0.074 -0.069 -0.069 -0.088 -0.056 -0.091
(0,1) indicator that -0.046*** -0.032* -0.014 -0.038*** -0.021** -0.030** -0.016 -0.046*** 0.009 -0.024** -0.034*
worker is in India (0.016) (0.019) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017)
Observations 1,687 957 5,953 1,447 6,193 4,180 3,460 4,463 3,178 5,642 1,321
Mean of DV -0.004 -0.027 0.000 0.006 -0.020 -0.006 0.007 -0.010 0.013 0.003 -0.012
(0,1) indicator that -0.048 -0.053 -0.003 -0.070* 0.006 -0.022 0.005 -0.030 0.010 0.001 -0.067
worker is in India (0.034) (0.044) (0.018) (0.037) (0.017) (0.023) (0.026) (0.022) (0.023) (0.019) (0.042)
Observations 1,344 816 4,591 1,350 4,585 3,247 2,688 3,379 2,556 4,463 1,021
Mean of DV 0.529 0.576 0.651 0.442 0.677 0.657 0.583 0.601 0.653 0.612 0.593
Relative effect -0.091 -0.092 -0.005 -0.158 0.009 -0.033 0.009 -0.050 0.015 0.002 -0.113
(0,1) indicator that -0.066*** -0.073* -0.019 -0.059 -0.024 -0.040* -0.018 -0.053** -0.011 -0.020 -0.063
worker is in India (0.033) (0.043) (0.019) (0.037) (0.019) (0.023) (0.026) (0.021) (0.023) (0.018) (0.044)
Observations 1,326 810 4,576 1,333 4,567 3,229 2,671 3,362 2,538 4,432 1,016
Mean of DV 0.655 0.671 0.683 0.617 0.694 0.699 0.651 0.658 0.703 0.667 0.674
Relative effect -0.101 -0.109 -0.028 -0.096 -0.035 -0.057 -0.028 -0.081 -0.016 -0.030 -0.093
Notes:  See Table 8.
App. Table 5: Separate analyses of Table 8 by split samples
The sample is contracts formed with ethnic Indian company contacts 
Estimates include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact
Panel A: DV is log hourly wage paid to worker
Panel B: DV is percentage differential between accepted contract and median proposal
Panel C: DV is a (0,1) "good performance" indicator from public feedback scores (feedback score greater than 4.5/5)
Panel D: DV is a (0,1) "good performance" indicator from private post-job survey
